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The Treatment of Products
from State-Controlled
Economies under the United
States Antidumping Law
STEPHANIE M. SMITH
When the Antidumping Act of 19211 was enacted,
the mechanics of its application to products of state-controlled econo-
mies (hereinafter SCES)2 understandably was not treated. There was
only one state-controlled economy in existence in 1921, and its trade
with the United States was relatively insignificant.
Recently, however, trade with SCEs has been increasing, and con-
tinued growth is likely. United States imports from SCEs in 1977
increased to $1,686 million from a volume of $50 million in 1951. 3
This larger volume of trade necessitates a reassessment of the way in
which the problems of interaction with these completely different
economies are handled.
It is to be expected that two different economic systems do not act
according to the same rules. Even if one trading partner has no ulte-
rior purpose, the mere fact that it has different bases for making
economic decisions may make those decisions seem unfair, or may
even cause injury to the other partner.
The United States antidumping law, by penalizing injurious im-
ports which are either discriminatorily priced or priced below cost,
requires that imports compete in the United States market accord-
ing to its rules and assumptions. The antidumping law thus appears
to be a reasonable mechanism for assuring that imports compete on
the same basis as domestic products. However, the antidumping
law is a product of the free market system it seeks to preserve. It is
not designed to deal with products from economies as different from
the free market as are the SCEs. As trade with SCEs has grown, the
law has been adapted and modified to account for the differences in
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economic systems; whether it is now adequate for its task is the
subject of this article.
SCEs in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, have been ac-
cused of dumping many times since the 1930s, when the Soviet
Union sold basic commodities on the world market at very low
prices, causing severe disruption. 4 Consequently, there has been a
persistent fear that the Soviet Union and other Communist countries
would use their state monopoly of trade to disrupt Western industries
for political reasons; 5 in fact, the dumping may simply reflect the
fact that production cost need not determine price in an economy
designed and operated for purposes different from the capitalist goal
of maximizing economic efficiency. 6
In an economy where exports and imports are determined by state
policy, economic planners may directly link the two in a way not
possible in a market economy. For example, if the Soviet Union has
an unanticipated need for imports, e.g., wheat, it might export large
quantities of surplus products at low prices, or even at a loss, to
obtain the foreign exchange needed to purchase the imports.7 The
export price would be determined not in relation to production costs,
but by the amount of foreign exchange needed.
SCEs may be tempted to lower prices for marketing reasons. For
the most part, the SCEs are newcomers to Western markets, and
must sell at a discount to overcome their recognition problem. Lower
prices may also be the inducement necessary to overcome consumer
resistance due to a lack of spare parts and servicing, uncertainty of
continued supply, buyers' fears of being blacklisted, or simply buyers'
anticommunist political biases. 8
Currency problems can contribute to an appearance of dumping
where there is none, or may disguise dumping where it in fact oc-
curs. Because the currencies of most SCE countries are not convert-
ible, there will likely be disparities between the domestic and foreign
values of the currency. The export price of a product could thus ap-
pear to be only a fraction of the domestic price.9
An SCE may dump for political as well as economic reasons. It
may, for example, wish to maintain its trade ties with a less devel-
oped country when trade at nondumping prices would not be advan-
tageous to the other country. Lowering prices artificially increases
the trade advantage to the less developed country, inducing a trade
dependence, which may lead to the desired political dependence. 10
Moreover, the possibility of predatory dumping and market manipu-
lation designed to disrupt Western industries, though unlikely, can-
not be ruled out.
Thus, in the state-controlled economy, domestic prices for goods
are not determined strictly by costs and market demand, but may
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reflect social and political considerations as well. Even if a domestic
price is based on production costs, the SCE may absorb certain costs
which in a traditional free market economy would be charged to the
producer (e.g., housing, medical care or education). Such prices are
noticonsidered to be in the "ordinary course of trade," which is the
basis for determining home market value under United States law."'
Finding a suitable substitute standard from which to evaluate the
margin of dumping is, then, the central problem in the application of
the United States antidumping law to the products of SCEs.
The problem of distorted cost distribution is not restricted to prod-
ucts from SCEs. In most western countries and almost all developing
countries there is some government regulation of or interference in
industry in one form or another.' 2 However, in other cases involving
government ownership of enterprises in non-state-controlled econo-
mies, Treasury has not disregarded the home market price.' 3
Treasury treated four early antidumping cases involving products
from SCEs similarly to cases from other countries. In Christmas
Tree Ornaments from Poland, there were no sales in the home mar-
ket; Treasury used the regular export price to third countries for the
dumping comparison.'4 In Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, Treasury
used domestic prices for the purposes of comparison, apparently
without questioning their validity.' 5
In Jalousie-Louvre Sized Sheet Glass from Czechoslovakia,16 where
there were no home market sales or sales to third countries, Treasury
used the prices of western European producers for comparison, be-
cause the information on costs of materials and labor in Czechoslo-
vakia necessary to determine a constructed value was not available.
In Portland Cement from Poland.Treasury disregarded available
home market prices for the first time because "sales for home con-
sumption in Poland are not made in the ordinary course of trade
within the meaning of the statute,"1 7 although Treasury did suggest
that it might have used a Polish export price to a third country had
there been other exports. (In future cases, however, export prices to
third countries would also be considered suspect.)
By ruling out home market prices and prices for export to third
countries as bases for antidumping comparisons, Treasury was
forced to develop a new measurement which would most closely ap-
proximate a free market price. In response to this problem, Treasury
formulated a "third country rule": in the absence of a home market
price or price to a third country it would determine the foreign mar-
ket value by using the home market price or the export price for the
same or similar product produced in a non-state-controlled economy,
usually a western European country.' Where comparable noncon-
trolled state prices are not available, a constructed value based on
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costs of the non-state-controlled economy producer would be used. 19
Eventually, this rule was enacted by the Trade Act of 1974 as 19
U.S.C. § 164(c). 2
0
The third country rule has been criticized by both SCEs and domes-
tic producers. Domestic producers note that where the third country
is also dumping the SCE will not be discovered if it dumps at a lesser
rate.21 The use of a western European producer's price may also al-
low any production economies of that producer to benefit a less effi-
cient producer in the SCE. SCE producers, on the other hand, protest
that the third country rule, by requiring them to charge the prices of
possibly less efficient producers in a different country, denies them
any price advantage that they possess. 22 They feel it is inherently
unfair that they be accountable for prices over which they have no
control and which they have difficulty discovering. While in two
1967 cases23 antidumping proceedings were discontinued and pro-
ducers were allowed to raise their prices after learning what the
constructed value would be, this practice has not been continued.
These problems seem relatively minor when compared with the
complicated issue presented in the case of Electric Golf Carts from
Poland24 where no third country manufactured the item. The market
for golf carts was largely confined to the United States. At the time
proceedings were begun, golf carts were manufactured in the United
States, Poland, Japan and Canada. Prices of Japanese manufactur-
ers were prohibitively high for the United States market; using Japa-
nese prices for the constructed value would have effectively pre-
vented Polish competition in this market. The Canadian producer
was very small and was going out of business. Nevertheless, Cana-
dian prices were used, resulting in a determination of sales at less
than fair value. Pezetel, the Polish producer, argued that the Cana-
dian prices were too high-that using them did not allow for Pezetel's
comparative cost advantages. The United States producers, on the
other hand, argued that the Canadian prices were distress sales and
consequently were too low.
The Canadian prices were used as a reference for liquidating
duties from March 1974 through August 1975. The Canadian pro-
ducer then went out of business, so there was no reference price at
all for Polish golf carts.
The American producers argued that under 19 U.S.C. § 164(c),
Treasury should resort to the United States price to find the fair
value. 25 Pezetel would then not be able to compete in the United
States market since it would have to charge the United States price
plus transportation costs for a product relatively unknown in the
United States market. 26 As of late 1978 the valuation problem still
had not been resolved, and duties have not been assessed for entries
after August 1975.
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Electric Golf Carts from Poland demonstrates that the third coun-
try rule is of limited utility when applied to cases where no valid
prices from foreign producers are available. Even when it works,
however, the third country rule does not achieve its aim of creating a
free market based on comparative advantage. The SCEs are only
allowed as much or as little advantage as any given non-SCE pos-
sesses. The SCEs understandably feel aggrieved by what they per-
ceive as an arbitrary rule. 27 The fact that the rule is "as good as any
other"28 and that no one has come up with a better provision 29 does
not allay the suspicions of either the domestic or the SCE producer
that the rule is not accurate enough to assure competition on an
equal footing.
In new regulations announced August 9, 1978,30 Treasury responded
to many complaints by specifying standards to be used in choosing a
country of comparison and announcing a new method of determining
constructed value.
The new regulations provide that foreign market value is to be
determined by prices of similar merchandise in a non-state-
controlled economy other than the United States.3 1 Where possible,
the country should be at "a stage of economic development compara-
ble to the state-controlled-economy country." Comparability is to be
determined by common economic data such as "per capita gross na-
tional product and infrastructure development (particularly in the
industry producing such or similar merchandise)." If no comparable
country can be found, the determination may be made using another
non-SCE country other than the United States. Only if prices or con-
structed value are still unavailable will Treasury use the prices and
costs in the United States.
32
A major change is made in the computation of the constructed
value in the absence of third country prices. Constructed value will
be determined by using the third country prices of the actual inputs
used by the SCE producer.33 In this way the SCE is allowed to take
advantage of any economies of production which it might have and
is prevented from taking advantage of the economies of the third
country producer which it does not share.
34
These changes in the Treasury regulations are, on the whole, an
improvement. By permitting consideration of the state of economic
development in choosing a third country, the Treasury Department
reduces the possibility that the SCE producer will be charged with
higher factor costs or other economic differences between economies
of different economic levels of development. Less developed coun-
tries, for example, usually have wage scales significantly below
those of developed countries. To equate the costs of production in the
two economies, therefore, is to eliminate entirely the comparative
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advantage that naturally accrues to a producer with those lower fac-
tor costs. The SCE producer obviously prefers the new constructed
value based on the producer's own inputs, because the constructed
value will now more closely reflect the actual costs, which still al-
lows a producer with a natural comparative advantage to profit from
it. In spite of this, constructed value probably will remain only an
alternative to third country prices under the present law. The con-
struction of a surrogate plant from the SCE inputs in a third country
is complicated and imprecise because of problems in valuing factor
costs in the third country and calculating inputs in the SCE. This
would be especially true where a given factory has several different
products, or in any other situation where allocating costs between
one or more products would be difficult. Assuming that the inputs
are determined and the costs in the third country available, there is
still the possibility of error or exaggeration as estimates at each dif-
ferent step are added to and multiplied by other estimates. 35
Constructed value is a closer approximation of true market value,
but is still only a second- (or third-) best guess of what the normal
costs, expenses, and profits for a given product would be. Dumping is
a free enterprise concept not easily adapted to trade with a state-con-
trolled economy; results are cumbersome and unpredictable. But the
newly-enacted regulations take some much needed steps toward the
goal of assuring free competition in our markets, with access by im-
ports determined as much as possible by comparative advantage.
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